Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Conceptualism, philosophy: the thesis that concepts are constructions of the human mind and, for their part, have no real existence. This also denies the existence of universals. They exist at most as divisions, but not as ideas. See also nominalism, conceptual realism, platonism, universals, ideas._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
E. Tugendhat on Conceptualism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 72f Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject Theory (>objet theory): States of affairs are taken as objects. Conceptualism: concepts are taken as objects. Immaterial - but also VsImagination. Instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure). TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion. >Aristotle, >Being. I 91 VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings". I 184f Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis. >Predicates, >Reference. I 185 Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete imagination. >Nominalism, >Universals. ConceptualismVsNominalism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual. NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations. >Generality, >Ludwig Wittgenstein. I 189 VsConceptualism: object dispensable. >Conceptualism/Quine. Nominalism: 1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous? 2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning. I 204 Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color". >Imagination, >Colour._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
||
> Counter arguments against Tugendhat
> Counter arguments in relation to Conceptualism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27